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Abstract 
The Groves-Ledyard mechanism theoretically can solve the "free-rider" problem in public 
good provision. Two questions are of overriding importance in implementing the mech­
anism. The first is related to the actual performance of the mechanism in general. The 
second is the choice of a "punishment parameter", /, which is the only parameter that is 
available for those that may want to actually use the mechanism. Thus the determination 
of the role of this variable on mechanism performance is fundamental for any advances 
along the lines of actual implementation. In studying the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, 
we show that the punishment parameter, 'Y plays a crucial role in the performance of the
mechanism. By using/ = 1 and 100, we show that under the higher punishment pa­
rameter, the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium is chosen much more frequently; a higher level 
of the public good is provided and efficiency is higher. By examining two behavioral 
models, we show that a higher 'Y leads to an increase in the probability of an individual
choosing a best response predicted by the model. The parameter, 'Y alone explains nearly
70% of the data in both the Cournot and the Carlson-Auster behavioral model. We also
found that convergence to Cournot behavior is faster and more stable under a high I 
than under a low 'Y· 
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1 Introduction 
The problem of cooperation appears frequently in the context of political behavior. The 
need of people to cooperate to finance local schools, city improvements, or police prcr 
tection is a commonly encountered phenomenon. The destructive nature of cooperation 
failures is clear and discussions of the problem are manifest in cases that range from the 
L.A. riot to the problems in Somalia or in the (armer Yugoslavia. A widely recognized 
problem for economics and political science has been to explore institutional designs that 
might facilitate cooperation. 
The problem of institutional design to foster cooperative actions is not an easy one. 
An important part of the problem has been to first attempt to find a normative standard 
that would foster cooperation and then secondly to make sure that individual incen­
tives are aligned with the standard. It is well understood that the lack of alignment 
between the standard and the incentive can be a serious inhibitor to cooperation. The 
prisoner's dilemma, the collective choice problem, the public good provision problem and 
the tragedy of the commons problem are all good examples. 
The problem of alignment has not been overlooked in the literature. For years a 
fundamental belief was that such an alignment was impossible regardless of the normative 
standard. That is, it was believed that all imaginable normative standards would suffer
from the problem. In recognition of this problem the academic course reflected in the 
literature was to avoid a direct confrontation with it. Researchers such as R. Bates 
(1985, 1988) and E. Ostrom (1990) began to search field settings and historical situation 
to discover how societies have been coping and they have excited the profession with 
reports of the ingenuity of institutional designs invented in the field. However, examples 
•We would like to thank John Ledyard for his many insightful discussions and suggestions, Dave 
Grether, Scott Page, Arthur "Skip" Lupia for their comments, and Hsing-Yang Lee for computer pro­
gramming. Any remaining errors are our own. Email: yan@hss.caltech.edu, cplott@hss.caltech.edu. 
1 
found in the field have tended to contain elements apart from the pure collective problem 
and so the belief about the fundamental impossibility remained. An intuition about both 
the nature of the belief and the depth of the belief is captured by the following quote 
from Paul Samuelson who is summarizing the problem as it is found in the problem of 
public goods: 
One can imagine every person in the community being indoctrinated to 
behave like a parametric decentralized bureaucrat who reveals his preferences 
by signalling in response to price parameters, . . . to questionnaires, or to 
other devices. But there is still this fundamental technical difference going 
to the heart of the whole problem of social economy: by departing from his 
indoctrinated rules, any one person can hope to snatch some selfish benefit in 
a way not possible under the self-policing competitive pricing of private goods; 
and the "external economies" or "jointness of demand" intrinsic to the very 
concept of collective goods and governmental activities makes it impossible 
for the grand ensemble of optimizing equations to have that special pattern 
of zeros which makes laissez-faire competition even theoretically possible as 
an · analogue computer. (p.389, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure" , 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954.) 
The research world was shocked with the publication of a paper by Groves and Led­
yard ( 1977). who produced the outline of a pro.cess that demonstrated that the funda­
mental belief is wrong. The very existence of the Groves-Ledyard process, which will 
be described later in this paper, proves that the proposition advanced by Samuelson 
is simply wrong. In the world of theory at least, there is no logical incompatibility of 
purpose. 
The Groves-Ledyard mechanism formulates a particular allocation-taxation scheme 
such that individuals find it in their self-interest to reveal their true preferences for 
the level of public goods provided. Furthermore, the resulting level of public goods 
provided would be Pareto optimal. i.e., it would be the same as if individuals had been 
"indoctrinated to behave like a parametric decentralized bureaucrat" described in the 
quote by Samuelson. In other words, the Groves-Ledyard (hereafter shortened as GL) 
mechanism provides a set of incentives for individuals to reveal their' true demand for the 
public goods. So, at certain critical points in the evolution of the cooperative agreement 
the incentives of individuals become perfectly aligned with the "normative standard" . 
Now the example produced by Groves and Ledyard is definitely a paper process. It 
exists only on the pages of a journal, but its importance should not be underestimated. It 
might be possible to take the idea of a process discovered by Groves and Ledyard, refine it, 
make it operational and put it to use as an actual political/economic process that solves 
fundamental social problems. Thus the problem of the alignment of normative standard 
with incentives would be solved by a working example. The institutional design problem 
would have evolved to its next logical step. That possibility motivates the research 
reported in this paper. 
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The research strategy is to observe the behavior of the process in the context of the 
simple situations that can be created in a laboratory and assess its performance relative 
to what it was created to do and relative to the theory upon which its creation rests. Such 
observation requires that the process be developed in the context of an actual decision 
problem faced by real (not imaginary) people who have real incentives. The formal 
concepts of strategy and information must be given life in terms of the rights that people 
have to take actions in the context of a decision process and also in terms of information 
that is within the grasp of human perceptions. 
Two questions are of overriding importance. The first is related to the actual per­
formance of the GL mechanism in general. The second is the role of a "punishment 
parameter" , '' which is the only parameter that is available for those that may want
to actually use the GL mechanism. Thus the determination of the role of this variable 
on mechanism performance is fundamental for any advances along the lines of actual 
implementation. 
The second question about the relationship between this "punishment" factor and 
the degree to which the ultimate decisions of the process are in conformance with the 
normative standard, which in this case is measured by system "efficiency" , which will be 
developed at length in the paper. In other words, the GL mechanism is actually a family 
of mechanisms. depending on the choice of this punishment parameter1. For practical 
implementation of the mechanism, we need to know how the performance of the system 
will respond if this punishment parameter is increased or decreased. Theory does not 
address this question except to suggest that if this particular type of punishment is "too 
high" the process will not respond at all. Such testing of the sensitivity of the different 
G L mechanisms under different parameters has not been performed. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical features on the GL 
mechanism. Section 3 reviews previous experimental works on the GL mechanism, with 
comparisons of our proposal to the other experimental designs. In section 4, we describe 
this experimental design - the environment, the process and the procedures. Section 
5 gives a descriptive summary of data and some preliminary results. and then presents 
different behavioral models and their predictions to our data. In this section we also 
presents a logit analysis to identify and discuss the impact of the different parameters on 
the behaviors of the subjects. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Groves-Ledyard Mechanism 
The GL mechanism allocates each individual's share of the cost of public good provision 
by 
1 Muench and Walker ( 1979, 1983) discussed some effects of parameter choices. 
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where 'Y > 0 is the punishment parameter, I is the number of people in the economy, xi 
is individual i's message, indicating his proposed addition to the total amount of public 
good provided, and X = Ei xi is the total amount of public good. Define Si = Ej# Xj
as the sum of the proposed increments by all other members of the group except i, and 
µi = Si/ I as the mean of others' messages, and uf = l:h;ti(xh - µi)2 /(I - 2) as the
squared standard error of the mean of others' messages. q is the per unit cost of the
public good. 
Some features of the mechanism are important for understanding and implementing 
the mechanism. As we can observe from the tax function of the GL mechanism, two 
parameters, 'Y and J, define a family of GL mechanisms. -By--varying the punishment
parameter, 'Y, we change the weight on the penalty imposed on an individual from devi­
ating from the mean of other players' messages. The other parameter is the size of the
economy, I, i.e., the number of individuals in the economy. 
----. 
In our experiment, we do not consider the influence of size on the properties of the 
equilibria, especially as the size of the economy grows towards infinity. Technology is 
not up t<? the task. So we choose a fixed size of the economy, and let the punishment 
parameter vary, in order to test effects of the punishment parameter on the performance 
of the mechanism. 
In this experiment, preferences are induced on units of the abstract public good by 
an individually specified value function, Vi(X), '"".hich indicates the amount of money an 
individual will receive if the group choice of the public good is X and if the individual
pays nothing for it. At each level of public good decided by the group, an individual's net 
earning in dollars is NVi = Vi(X) - Ci(xilSi, ai), where G;(xilSi, O'i) is the amount of tax
individual i pays if his proposed addition to the total amount of public good provided is 
xi, the sum of the proposed increments by all other members of the group except i is Si, 
and the squared standard error of the mean of others' messages is u[ . 
Therefore, each individual has a monetary profit, and if one assumes that individuals 
have a strictly monotone increasing utility of money, then the problem becomes 
Then in equilibrium. individual i submit a message, xf, such that 
This equation simply ·says that each individual will report a "desired quantity" of the 
public good which equates the marginal private benefit perceived with the marginal 
private cost perceived given the decisions of others. 
The marginal cost of public good to individual i is 
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Therefore, we can see that changes in "(will affect individual's equilibrium message, Xi. 
The effects of punishment parameters on individuals' behaviors will be developed further 
later. 
The Lindahl equilibrium [Xe, {Vi(Xe)}] satisfy
I 
L Vi'(Xe) = qi=l 
for the experimental environment. So the sum of individual marginal values for the public 
good equals the marginal rate of transformation. 
Another important feature in the GL mechanism is that it balances budget both on 
and off the equilibrium path, i.e., it guarantees a balanced budget for every X > 0, i.e.,
'2:[=1 Ci(xilSi, ai) = qX. This is achieved by the last term in the GL rule, the squared
standard error of the mean of others' messages, af. Including this term gives additional 
difficulties in implementation by adding another dimension to the individuals' decision 
problem, but it is crucial to keep balanced budget. 
3 Previous Implementation 
There have been two groups of experiments with mechanisms that were motivated by 
the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. Vernon Smith (1979) did two sets of experiments, using 
a simplified version of the mechanism which only balanced the budget in equilibrium, 
i.e., one needs to know the equilibrium in order to balance the budget. The complete
G L mechanism balances budget both on and off the equilibrium path. The punishment 
parameter was set to be one. 
Harstad and Marresse (hereafter shortened as HM) (1978, 1979, 1981) had two sets of 
experiments motivated by the GL mechanism. The first set experiments did not satisfy 
balanced budget: they used the Smith parameters, but with a different process - the 
Seriatim process2. Their second set of experiments was a computerized version with the 
balanced budget on and off the equilibrium path. 
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 summarizes the ·main differences of the· Smith, HM and our experimental 
designs. The two Smith experiments and Harstad-Mirresse (1) do not satisfy the balanced 
budget constraint off the equilibrium path, so what they studied was not the actual GL 
mechanism. Harstad-Mirresse (2) use the complete version of the mechanism, and with 
different punishment parameters and number of subjects. We argue that changing the 
2To be discussed later in this section. 
5 
punishment parameters and number of subjects simultaneously, as was done in Harstad­
Mirresse (2), do not allow one to study the exact impact of the two parameters; besides, 
the magnitude of changes are so small, that its effects would be very difficult to discern 
in a lab environment. Indeed, the effect of parameters are not discussed in Harstad and 
Marresse (1981). Neither experiments addressed the role of the punishment parameters 
in the performance of the mechanism. 
Another important difference between our implementation and the previous attempts 
lie in the processes used. Both the Smith process and the Seriatim process requires 
unanimity, which might add unwanted complexity to the static GL mechanism. They 
have the common shortcoming of involving too much cheap-talk and manipulation. Since 
the subjects are only paid when agreements are reached, they need not be responsible 
for each decision they make. From our pilot experiments using the Smith process (See 
Appendix B) and Banks, Plott and Porter (1987), unanimity was found to decrease the 
efficiency of the system. Therefore, we discard these two processes and use a completely 
different process in this experiment. 
4 Testbed Environment 
The testbed environment reflects both technical and theoretical considerations. A major 
consideration of any field application is that the process of the public goods provision 
cover the cost of the public good. Thus we want' to study only the processes that satisfy 
the balanced budget property under both conditions of "equilibrium" and "disequilib­
rium". In addition we are interested in the influence of the magnitude of the punishment 
parameter. These considerations taken together with the technilogical problems that 
they cause motivated an experimental design in which the size of the economy is fixed 
(the number of agents) and the punishment parameter is varied. The economic envi­
ronment, the institutional process and the experimental procedures are discussed in the 
sections below. 
4.1 The Economic Environment 
In designing the experiment to test the GL mechanism, we use a simple constant unit cost, 
q, to produce the public good. Preferences are induced on units of the abstract public 
good by an individually specified value function, Vi(X), which indicates the amount of 
money an individual will receive if the group choice of the public good is X and if the 
individual pays nothing for it. At each level of public good decided by the group, an 
individual's net earning in dollars is N\!i = Vi(X)-Ci(xilSi, ai), where Ci(x;!Si, ai) is the
amount of tax individual i pays if his proposed addition to the total amount of public
good provided is xi, the sum of the proposed increments by all other members of the 
group except i is S1, and the squared standard error of the mean of others' messages is
a?. The form of this individual tax is the essense of the GL mechanism, which is analysed 
in detail in section 2. 
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In our experimental design, there are five individuals, I = 5. The constant unit cost 
of the public good is q = 5. The valuation functions are quadratic, 
Vi(X) = AiX - BiX2 + ai, 
and the GL cost function, in this specific design is 
[Table 2.1 about here] 
Table 2.1 lists the parameters of individual subject's valuation functions and their 
equilibrium values under both punishment parameters. Note that the subjects have 
quite diverse tastes for the public good. The marginal valuation functions, Vi' (X), are 
shown in Figure 4. Subject 1 's marginal valuation for the public good is negative at all 
levels; i.e., it is a public bad for him. The other four players' marginal valuations are also 
quite different from each other. At the equilibrium, where X = 5, both Subject 4 and 5 
have marginal valuation higher than the marginal cost of the public good, while Subject 
1 and 2 have marginal valuations below the marginal cost. In a voluntary contribution 
situation, we would expect Subject 4 and 5 to contribute close to the optimal amount of 
the public good. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Since we study the impact of different punishment parameters of the GL mechanism, 
we concentrate on whether and how likely individu8.I subjects follow their Lindahl equi­
libria under different punishment parameters. Table 2.1 shows that when 'Y = 1, the 
punishments for deviation from the mean of others is not severe, therefore their equi­
librium messages varies from each other. When 'Y = 100, however, the incentive for
converging to the mean of others' messages are so strong, that all equilibrium messages 
are "squeezed" towards one, and the distribution of costs also move towards uniform. In 
both cases, the group optimal quantity of public good is 5. 
4.2 The Institutional Process 
For these experiments, we introduce a Periodic Process. That is, on each trial, each 
subject i chooses a message. Xj, and sends it to the central computer. The computer
calculates the total level of public good, X = I:;=l xi, the sum of others' proposals, the
variances of others' proposals and each subject's net payoff, and sends these information 
to the subjects' screens. The subjects are paid each trial for each decision they make. 
The process repeats for T periods, which are announced in the instruction. 
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This process differs from other processes. Subjects are paid for each decision, so 
all messages involve commitment and are communicated with incentives in the process. 
Theoretically there is less incentive for cheap talk. Thus, the cheap talk effect should be 
reduced. 
4.3 Experimental. Procedures
Four experiments were conducted using Caltech undergraduates. While most of the 
subjects had participated in computerized economic experiments before, no one had ever 
participated in a Groves-Ledyard experiments. Each experiment consisted of two sessions. 
And each session consisted of 30 periods, with the first five periods being the practice 
rounds without payment. The practice rounds were used to instruct the subjects about 
the functions of different keys, how to send in a proposal and how to read and record a 
result from the screen (see Computer Instructions in Appendix A). Two experiments 
started with 30 trials of 'Y = 1 design followed by 30 trials of the 'Y = 100 design; and
another two experiments had the reversed order. Each experiment lasted between 1 and 
1 .5 hours. Table 2.2 summarizes these four experiments. 
[Table 2.2 about here] 
At the beginning of each experiment, each subject had a set of instructions, a set of 
payoff tables and record sheet. Because we use the complete version of the GL mech­
anism, the payoff tables are necessarily three-dimensional3• The experimenter read the 
instructions and taught the subjects how to use the keyboard, how to send messages and 
how to record results from the computer. After the Computer Instruction, the subjects 
were required to finish the Review Questions, which were meant to test if the subjects
really understand the instructions. Then the experimenter went through the answers to 
the review questions and answered any questions. After this, the subjects were supposed 
to read and sign the Financial Agreement, which required them to work in the lab in 
case of negative earning (see Appendix A). 
Then the experiment began. Each subject sent in his/her proposed addition of the 
public good through the computer, the central computer calculated the total level of the 
project(X), the sum of other subjects' proposed additions (Si), the variance of other 
subjects' additions (o}, or Di as in the instructions), and the net value of the project for 
each subject-(N\!i, or� as in the instructions), and sent these information back to the 
subjects' screen. The subjects were then required to fill these information in his record 
sheet. They were strongly encouraged to refer to their payoff tables before and after 
each decision. and most subjects did look it up in their payoff tables before sending their 
messages and after receiving the feedbacks. The process repeated for 25 periods. At the 
end of an experiment. the subjects added up their total earnings (in francs) in all 25 
3see Appendix A for an example of the structure of the payoff tables. 
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periods and converted them to dollar payments. The conversion rate was announced at 
the beginning of the experiments and was written on the blackboard for their attention. 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Summary of Data 
The important basic results that can be obtained from the raw data are listed as Result 1 
through Result 4. Two questions are of overriding importance. The first is related to the 
actual performance of the GL mechanism in general. The second is the role of 'Y· Recall 
that the literature has not addressed the possible impact of 'Yon the performance of the 
mechanism except in an infinite economy (Muench and Walker 1979), yet 'Y is the only 
parameter that is available for those that may want to actually use the GL mechanism. 
Thus the determination of the role of this variable on mechanism performance is funda­
mental for any advances along the lines of actual implementation. Together these four 
results p:r:ovide the first facts that we have for the classic GL mechanism. A more de­
tailed examination of individual behavioral models and the principles that might underlie 
individual decisions is reserved for sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
Table 3 shows the aggregate results of the experiments. Each session has two sets 
of experiments, marked by a and b. Experiment. a proceeds experiment b. The order of 
the experiments is a treatment variable. In two sessions (0219-93 and 0401-93) we have 
the / = 1 trials before the / = 100 trials, and vice versa in the other two experiments.
N stands for the numbers of trials in each session, each session have 25 trials except for 
0305-93b which has one more trial. We use Ji to denote the frequency that a subject 
proposes the addition i, and ft to denote the equilibrium proposal for the subject(s). 
Though the aggregate level of public good can range from -10 to 30, we only list the 
values actually chosen in the experiments. 
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 3 (continued) about here] 
Results 1 and 2 tell us that the promise provided by theory, that the GL mechanism 
can be used to solve·the public goods problems is true in fact. Still, we can see that 
the variable / is important because when it is increased the efficiency of the process
increases and the aggregate level of the public good is closer to the .optimal. Result 3 
further confirms that / has a role to play in the performance of the mechanism.
RESULT 1 The average group efficiency increases when 'Y increases.
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SUPPORT. The last column of Table 3 (continued) shows the efficiencies of every 
experiment and the average efficiencies of the two sets of experiments. The average 
efficiency is 91.1% when"(= 1, and 97.7% when 'Y = 100. D 
RESULT 2 The average level of public good provided increases when 'Y increases and
the efficient level is chosen more frequently under higher 'Y· 
SUPPORT. The level of public good provided for each experiment and the mean level 
are presented in Table 3 (continued). The average level of public good provided is 4.70 
when 'Y = 1, and 4.91 when 'Y = 100. The group efficient level, X = 5, is chosen 28% of
the times when 'Y = 1 and 47% of the times when 'Y = 100. D 
Although the group efficiency level (the GL equilibrium) is chosen significantly less 
frequently when 'Y is low, the overall efficiency is still above ninety percent. This is
because the actual group payoff, �i(Vi(X) - Ci) = �i Vi(X) - qX, aggregate out 1's
incentive effect on the individual 's cost share. The function of the punishment parameter 
is to induce the group efficient level of public good to be chosen more frequently. So the 
efficiency is slightly higher when 'Y = 100, but in either case it is above ninety percent
on average. 
The aggregate data can have a tendency to hide the potential importance of 'Y· First,
the cost of adjustment as created by 'Y is a type of zero-sum game. The cost paid by one
individual is a benefit received by another. Thus the cost of adjustment cannot appear 
in the aggregate data. In addition, because the efficiency levels of the mechanism are so 
high, even under low level of"(, there would seem to be little room for the variable to 
have an effect. The next result signals that significant effects of 'Y exist in the data and
thus the result serves as a basis for a more detailed analysis of individual behavior. 
RESULT 3 The increase of 'Y reduces dispersion of outcomes across experiments.
SUPPORT. Table 3 shows that when / = 1, 12 out of 26 nonoptimal levels of public
good are chosen with positive frequencies; while only the 5 alternatives closest to the 
group efficient level are chosen in the / = 100 case. 0 
Result 3 indicates that some of the role of 'Y can be detected at the aggregate level
of analysis. While the aggregate results may be of interests, the details of individual 
decisions are more instructive. Understanding of Result 4 can best be prepared by a 
detailed study of the patterns of individual behavior. 
Tables 4.1 - 4.5 present the frequencies of choosing each alternative by each subject4• 
The subjects are numbered so that an individual indexed kin one experiment has exactly 
4The raw data and computer programs are available from the authors by request. 
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the same induced preferences as the individual indexed k in the other experiments. A 
brief review of the individual statistics is useful to help the reader read the tables and 
understand the peculiar aspects of the detailed behavior. 
[Table 4.1 about here)
When 'Y = 1, subject l's equilibrium choice is xi = -1. In the four sessions, half of 
the subjects who have the incentive structure of subject 1 choose -2 more frequently, and 
the other half chooses their equilibrium, -1, more frequently. On average, -1 is chosen 
slightly less frequently than -2, though it is still one of the bimodal distributions. When 
'Y = 100, however, the equilibrium choice for subject 1, xi = 1, is chosen 713 of the times
on average. And it is the most frequent choice for every subject, chosen more than 563 
of the times. When 'Y = 1, the payoff for x1 =· -1, denoted by P_1 is strictly greater than 
the payoffs of other choices only at the equilibrium, S1 = 6. For any slight disturbances, 
P_1 no longer dominates other choices. For S1 E [3, 5), P_2 and P-1 round up to exactly
the same integer values. And for S1 � 2, we have P_2 > P_1• Therefore, when the 
choices-vary around the equilibrium value, the probability of choosing -2 instead of -1 
is rather high. When 'Y = 100, however, the equilibrium choice strongly dominates other 
choices not only at the equilibrium, but also around the equilibrium. 
[Table 4.2 about here)
When 1 = 1 ,  three out of the four subject 2's choose their equilibrium, x; = 0 more
frequently than other alternatives. On average, Nash equilibrium, chosen 503 of the 
times, is the mode of the distribution. Compared with Subject 1 's payoff structure, the 
equilibium choice weakly dominates the other payoffs -at three values: S2 = 4, 5, 6. When
S2 < 4, P1 > P2; when S2 > 6, P_1 > Po. Therefore, the equilibrium value, 1 is chosen
most frequently, and both -1 and 0 are chosen with substantial frequencies. When 
1 = 100. the Nash equilibrium, x; = 1, is chosen 753 of the times on average. Again,
the equilibrium choice strongly dominates other choices at and around the equilibrium, 
thus providing strong incentives for the subjects to play Nash. 
[Table 4.3 about here]
For subject 3's, the average frequency of choosing the €quilibrium, x; = 1 when 'Y = 1, 
though highest among the frequencies of the same punishment parameter, is less than 
half of the frequency of choosing the equilibrium when 'Y = 100. When 'Y = 1, for S3 < 4, 
P2 � ?1• and for 53 > 4, Po � P1, which partly explains why 0 is chosen 313 of the 
time. and 2 is chosen 18% of the time.
[Table 4.4 about here]
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When 'Y = 1, P1 > P2 for S4 > 3; Pa > P2 for S4 < 3. Conjecture, in session 0304-93b
and 0305-93b, most of the times S4 > 3. Again, when we increase 'Y to 100, the average
frequency of attained Nash is almost three times as high as when 'Y = 1.
[Table 4.5 about here] 
Subject 5's choice distribution follows a similar pattern as the other subjects. 
The next result indicates that the role of 'Y becomes very pronounced at the individual
level of analysis. Result 4 is built from an application of the equilibrium properties 
implicit in the behavioral theory of the GL mechanism and asks to what extent the static 
equilibrium behavior can be detected in the choice behavior of individuals. The result 
provides both absolute and relative measurements of the accuracy of the equilibrium 
model when the model is applied at the individual level of analysis under both conditions 
of 'Y = 1 and 'Y = 100.
RESULT 4 The equilibrium model applied to individual choice behavior increases in
accuracy when 'Y increases.
SUPPORT. In Table 4.1 - 4.5, the column, ft, indicates the frequency of each indi­
vidual's choice of their GL equilibria. The mean frequency of equilibrium choice of 38% 
when / = 1 and 80% when 'Y = 100; it is the mode choice (i.e., most frequent choice) of
10 individuals out of 20 when 'Y = 1, and 20 out of 20 when 'Y = 100. D 
5.2 Behavioral Models 
The above analysis makes clear that individual behavior is important. This section is 
an attempt to develop some intuition about the principles of individual behavior that 
might be operating in the context of the mechanism. Two standard models (Ledyard 
1978) can be used as benchmarks. These are the Cournot model, which has individual 
using information only one period back and the other is the Carlson-Auster model that 
has individual using information from alll past periods and giving them equal weight. 
The underlying rationale for these models are described below. Recall, an individual's 
value function for public ·good is 
and the G L cost function is 
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In equilibrium, from Vi' = c;' we get
where 
('y/I) -2Bi Ai -q/l ai = 'Y(l - 1)/1+2Bi'
bi = 'Y(l - 1)/J + 2Bi.
For our design and environment, the set of parameters are presented in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The Cournot Model: Individual players follows Cournot behavior, i.e., x� -
ais:-l +bi. 
To test the accuracy of the Cournot hypothesis, we first classify our raw data to see 
the frequency of Cournot reactions. 
[Table 6 about here] 
An obvious pattern is that Cournot behavior explains over half of the choices when 
1 = 100, but does not explain a majority of choices when 'Y = 1. We can classify most
of the subjects as Cournot players when / = 100. When 'Y = 1, however, only a few
subjects seem to play Cournot, such as subject No. 1 and 2 in session 0401-93a. 
RESULT 5 Cournot behavior is predominant when 'Y = 100; it is used less than half of 
the times when 'Y = 1.
SUPPORT. Table 6 shows that 403 of the choices on average are Cournot best response 
under �f = 1, while 803 of the choices can be categorized to Cournot behavior when
/ = 100. D 
We also want to see how fast the subjects converge to Cournot messages under the 
two punishment parameters. We define Cvg= f��, where g(Sf-1) = aisf-1 + bi, T is
the total rounds and n is the -initial number of rounds. The purpose of this definition 
of convergence is to see if the subjects make Cournot responses more frequently as they 
play along. and if they converge in probability to Cournot behavior. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
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Figure 5 shows player 1 's rate of convergence to Cournot behavior under 'Y = 1 and
'Y = 100 in experiment 0219-93a and 0219-93b respectively. The pattern exhibited in the
figure is typical in most of the experiments, i.e., 
RESULT 6 Under 'Y = 1, convergence to Cournot behavior is seldom, slow and unstable;
while under 'Y = 100, the convergence is fast and stable for most of the subjects.
SUPPORT. All of the experiments exhibit similar patterns as those shown in Figure 5, 
i.e., under 'Y = 100 convergence to Cournot behavior is fast and stable, while under 'Y = 1
the convergence is slow and unstable, and over half of the times, it does not converge at
all. 0 
One of the limitations of the Cournot model is it assumes that subjects base their best 
responses only on the information they receive in the previous period. An alternative 
approach, a more reasonable one, is that subjects base their best responses on all the 
information they receive in the previous periods. How much weight each subject put in 
each of.the previous period's information might differ among periods and subjects. Here, 
we examine a simple version of this type of models, when all previous periods are given 
equal weight by all subjects. Carlson-Auster Expectations Model assumes that each 
subject base his best responses upon the average of all previous period's information. 
Carlson-Auster Expectations Model: .Individual subjects follow Cournot re­
sponse based on the average of au previous period's information, i.e., x� = aic�1 I:�-:i sn+ 
bl 
Using the CA Model to analyse our experimental data, we get the frequencies and 
statistics of Carlson-Auster behavior summarized in Table 7.
[Table 7 about here] 
RESULT 7 The subjects use Carlson-Auster best responses to an average of the previ­
ous periods· information over half of the times under both punishment parameters. The 
prediction of the Carlson-Auster model is more accurate than the Cournot model. 
SUPPORT. As shown in Table 7, when 'Y = 1, 52% of the choices on average are Carlson­
Auster best responses; when 'Y = 100, 81 % of the choices on average are Carlson-Auster
best responses. Only in one out of eight experiments the rate of CA behavior is less than 
50%. Compared to the Cournot model, the Carlson-Auster Expectations model explains 
higher percentage of the data under both punishment parameters. 0 
The result is that the Carlson-Auster model in which subjects are seen as averaging 
out all the past information and then optimizing is more accurate than the Cournot model 
which predicts that the subjects only look at the previous period before optimizing. 
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5.3 Logit Analysis: Incentives and Choice Behavior 
From the above classification of raw data, the role of 'Y in individual subjects' decision to 
use Cournot best responses or Carlson-Auster best responses is obvious. We would like to 
explore the possibility that various factors might contribute to individual's tendency to 
use either Cournot or Carlson-Auster best responses. Apart from 'Y, could the probability 
of individual choices be related to the parameters of their preferences for the public good? 
Why are certain factors affect the probability of individual choices? 
These questions can be analysed through "consistency checks" (Plott 1993), i.e., if 
reasons that a process is working are given by the basic theory and principles that were 
used to design the process in the first place. Therefore, we proceed by an examination 
of possible relationships among the induced preferences, the punishment parameter and 
individual subjects' probabilities of choosing Cournot best response. Analysis of the 
Carlson-Auster model can be done in a similar way. 
A widely held belief in the experimental literature is that the predicative capacity of 
game theoretic or economic theoretic models improves as the level of incentive increases. 
This presumption plays such an active role in the analysis of this section that we give it 
a name. 
The General Incentive Hypothesis. The error of game theoretic and economic the­
oretic models decreases as the level of incentive increases. 
Applying the General Incentive Hypothesis to this analysis, let us consider a subject's 
probability of choosing his Cournot best response, � ( C), as a decreasing function of his
net gain from deviating from Cournot. We use NV/ to denote a subj.ect's net value from 
choosing Cournot response, NV/' to denote his net value from choosing a message ei away 
from his Cournot response, xf = ai sf-1 + bi. His deviation, ei E [� 
.
- xf, x - xn, where
� and x denote the upper and lower bound of the subjects' message space. Therefore,
omitting the subscript i for simplicity, a subject's net value from deviating from Cournot
best response is 
') q 'Y J- 1 . s 2 2 NF0=A(xc+E+S)-B(xc+E+S)�+o-[I(xc+E+S)+2(-1 -(xc+c:-1 _ 1 ) -CJ)],
and his net gain from deviating, 
NG' - Ac: - Bc:(2xc + E + 2S) - [�E +'!..I - 1 c-(2xc + E: - �)] I 2 I · · J- 1 
J- 1 - -(B + 2J'Y)c2.
It follows from the algebra that an increase in either Bi or 'Y leads to a decrease of the
net gain from deviation. Application of the General Incentive Hypothesis leads to the 
following proposition. 
PROPOSITION. An increase in/ or Bi will cause the subjects to choose Cournot best
responses with a higher probability. 
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Therefore, in the logit analysis, we consider two independent variables: "f, the pun­
ishment parameters and Bi, the coefficient of individuals' value functions for the public 
good. The dependent variable is a discrete choice variable, y, which equals one if a
subject makes a Cournot best response, and zero otherwise. Therefore, the model is 
P[y = 1] = 4!({/ x).
Coefficients, t-statistics (in brackets) , log likelihood· and the percentages correctly pre­
dicted for each model are given in Table 8. 
[Table 8 about here] 
For the Cournot hypothesis, we consider two logit models, C1 and C2• The simple 
basic model C1 has only one independent variable, x = "'(,i.e., a player's decision depends 
only upon 'Y. In C2, Bi is added as an independent variable to the basic model.
In �esting the impact of different parameters on the probability of Carlson-Auster 
hypothesis, we devise similar logit models, and get models CAi, which are tabulated in 
the last two columns of Table 8. 
As we see in the model C1, in the basic model for Carlson-Auster hypothesis, CAi, 
'Y alone explains nearly 703 of the data. A. consistent pattern in all four models is the
positive and significant impact of / and Bi on the choice of best responses behavior, 
which confirms our observations from the classification of the raw data and theoretical 
deduction. 
RESULT 8 The single most important factor that ·affects the subjects' probabilities of
choosing best responses is 'Y· An increase in 'Y leads to an increase in the probability of
an individual choosing his best response, in both Cournot and Carlson-Auster behavioral 
models. 
SUPPORT. In basic model C1• 1· alone is able to correctly predict 69.9483 of the
observations. In C A1, /alone explains 663 of the data. In all four models, the coefficients 
of/ are significant at 993 level, and are positive, which says that an increase in 'Y leads
a subject to choose Cournot responses with higher probability. D 
RESULT 9 The preference parameter, Bi, has a significant and positive impact on the 
probability of an individual choosing his best response. An increase in Bi leads to an 
increase in the probability of an individual choosing his best response, in both the Cournot 
and the Carlson-Auster behavioral model. 
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SUPPORT. In C2, Bi is significant at the 903 level; in CA2, Bi is significant at 993
level. In both models, the coefficients of Bi are positive. In CA2, the percentage of data 
predicted rises from 66.4253 to 69.5343 after Bi is added as an independent variable. D 
The tendency of an individual to use a Cournot-type response is related to the de­
tails of the individual's preferences. The level of Bi, which has a negative impact on 
an individual's marginal value of the public good, also influences his tendency to give a 
Cournot or Cournot-related response. An increase in Bi leads to an increase in the prob­
ability of an individual choosing his best response. This is consistent with the General 
Incentive Hypothesis and the Proposition about the probability of an individual choosing 
best-responses. Such relationships have been observed before in voluntary contribution 
experiments. 
OBSERVATION. The influence of Bi in these data is consistent with the influence of
public goods valuation on voluntary contributions observed in other experiments. 
SUPPORT. The experimental literature suggests that the greater is the marginal value 
of a public good, the more is the tendency of an individual to voluntarily contribute to 
public goods (e.g. Isaac, McCue and Plott 1985, Isaac and Walker 1988, Palfrey and 
Prisbrey 1992). That is, if marginal rate of substitution between the public good and the 
private good increases then the individual values the public good more relative to the 
private good, and is willing to contribute more private good for the production of public 
good5. Thus the individual is less likely to follow the Cournot strategy for no provision of 
public goods. That is, as the benefit of the Cournot responses go down, the frequency of 
its use goes down. Therefore, in two completely different mechanisms, the parameters of 
individual's induced preferences have a consistent impact on an individual's probability 
of choosing best responses. Thus all of these observations are consistent with a general 
pattern of observation that connect the level and structure of rewards to the accuracy of 
an economic or game theoretic model6. D 
The logit analysis is consistent with the observation and Proposition about the impact 
of the punishment parameter, /. and the preference parameter, Bi on an individual's
probability of choosing the best responses. Regardless of which behavioral model is 
imposed. an increase in / supports the performance of the model.
6 Conclusions 
On paper the Groves-Ledyard mechanism solves the free rider problem that has been 
the cornerstone of the problem of public goods provision. The research reported here 
demonstrates that if the process is made operational through an implementation called a 
''periodic process". then in a simple but real environment the promise of the theory can 
be realized. 
5See Ledyard 1993 for a more rigorous treatment. 
6See Fiorina and Plott (1978) for an example in which two public goods are involved. 
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The effectiveness of the GL solution to the public goods problem is closely related 
to a special parameter which we have called the "punishment" parameter. As the level 
of "punishment" is elevated from a level 'Y = 1 to a level 'Y = 100, the efficiency of the
operation of the process increases from 91 % to 98% and the average level of provision 
increases from 4. 7 units to 4.9 units, which is to be compared with an optimum of 5 
units. Furthermore, an increase in the level of 'Y substantially decreases the dispersion of
the outcomes across experiments, thereby suggesting that it influences the reliability of 
the process. 
In any "testbed" experiments of the type reported here, it is useful to perform what 
has been called "consistency checks" (See Plott 1993) to determine if the reasons that a 
process is working are given by the basic theory and principles that were used to design 
the process in the first place. A process might be observed working but it might be 
working for the wrong reason. 
The consistency check on the mechanism reveals that over half of the individuals 
are exhibiting the type of behavior that is assumed by the principles of the GL model. 
That is , �>Ver half of the individual choices can be viewed as Cournot responses or, more 
accurately, as optimal responses based on a belief that other individuals will be choosing 
on average as they have chosen in the past (the Carlson-Auster model). The response 
of individual behavior to increases in 'Y is to increase the frequency of Cournot-type
responses and converge more rapidly to such responses. 
The focus on the punishment parameter creates another interesting question relevant 
to the actual implementation of the GL processes. Our results demonstrate that an 
increase in punishment increases the instance of Cournot type responses on which the 
mechanism depends. However, observing that the mechanism performs better under 
/ = 100 than under / = 1 does not lead to the conclusion that the higher the punishment
parameter is, the better the mechanism performs .. To illustrate the point, we consider 
what happens when / -+ oo. For simplicity, we use Cournot behavior as an example. At 
time t, player i 's Cournot reaction is 
x� a,s:-1 + bi
A - q/ I+ ('Y/ I -2Bi)St1
1(!-l)/I+2Bi
5t-l 
I --+ 
I - 1 , as I -+ oo. 
So when 'Y is very large, the subject's best response, if he follows Cournot behavior, is
to choose the mean of other subjects' last period message, to avoid being punished by 
the large /. Then we can induce a subject's best response at period t, given the initial 
choices of all subjects. Let subject i's initial move at time zero be x?, then X0 = Ei x?.
It is easy to prove that 
xt l 
1 ( -1)1+1 o t x� 
[7 +I(! - I)t]X + (-l) (I_: l)t
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xo 
-+ - as t -+ oo. 
I '
We can see that, given a large enough 'Y and long enough repetition, all subject's choices
converge towards the mean of the initial choices, which can be anything. So from our 
experiments and theoretical deduction, it is clear that as 'Y increases from one on, the
performance of the mechanism improves, but as it goes to infinity, the performance 
declines. Then what is the optimal choice of 'Y remains an open question.
The institutional design problem identified in the opening paragraphs of this paper 
are beginning to be solved. It is possible to align at least one normative criterion ( effi­
ciency) with the proper incentives. The paper processes when brought into the context 
of operational process work substantially as expected. The magnitude and nature of 
the incentives are important but they are important in ways that make intuitive sense. 
Whether or not the processes themselves (like the GL process) will ultimately provide the 
tools needed by those who wish to design process for implementation is the field remains 
to be seen. 
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Appendix A. Experiment Instructions 
You are about to participate in a decision process in which one of numerous competing 
alternatives will be chosen. This is part of a study intended to provide insight into certain 
features of decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good 
decisions you may earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash at the 
end of the experiment. 
This decision process will proceed as a series of trials during which a project level 
will be determined and financed. The "level" can be negative, zero or positive "units" , 
the exact level of which must be determined. Attached to the instructions you will find 
a series of tables, which describes the value to you of decisions made during the process, 
called the Payoff Tables. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your 
own private information. 
During each period a level of the project will be determined. For the first unit 
provided during a period you will receive the amount listed in row 1 of the Redemption 
Value Sheet. If a second unit is also provided during the period, you will receive the 
additional amount listed in row 2 of the Redemption Value Sheet. If a third unit is 
provided, you will receive, in addition to the two previous amounts, the amount listed in 
row 3, ect. As you can see, your individual total payment is computed as a sum of the 
redemption values of specific units. (These totals of redemption values are tabulated for 
your conveniece on the right hand side of the Redemption Value Sheet. )  
The payoff each period, which i s  yours to keep, i s  the differences between the total of 
redemption values of units of the project provided and your individual expentures on the 
project. All values are stated in francs and can be converted into cash at a rate of _ 
francs per dollar at the end of the experiment. Suppose, for example, your Redemption 
Value Sheet was as below and two units were provided. 
ProjectLevel 
(units ) 
1 
2 
3 
Redemption Value 
of SpecificUnits 
(francs) 
2500 
1 500 
1000 
T otalRedemption Value 
of AllUnits 
(francs) 
2500 
4000 
5000 
Your redemption value for the two units would be 4000 and your payoffs would be 
computed by substracting your individual expenditures from this amount. If 3 units 
were provided . the redemption value would be determined by the redemption values of 
the first and second unit plus the redemption value of the third unit, that is, 
2500 + 1 500 + 1000 = 5000.
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Each unit of the project costs _ francs. Hence, total cost for a project is _ times 
the project size. Your expenditure toward the total project cost for a trial is determined 
from your decision and the decisions of all others. Note that the redemption values can 
be negative. Your expenditures can also be negative. That is, rather than paying for the 
project you are paid. 
Your individual decisions will influence both the final level of the project chosen by 
the group and your individual expenditures on the project. Recall, your payoffs from the 
experiment will be the difference between the redemption values (positive or negative) 
that are determined by the level of the project chosen and your individual expenditures 
(positive or negative). These will be explained in turn. 
Project level determination (X) Each period each individual will choose a pro­
posed addition (x) to the status quo of zero provision. This proposed addition can be 
any amount ranging from _ to _. These amounts will be added together to get the 
total of proposed additions (X). This total is the project level that will be chosen. 
Level of individual expenditures ( c) The level of your individual expenditures 
depends upon your individual proposed addition (x), the proposed additions of other par­
ticipants (S) and the variability among the proposed additions of the other participants 
( o ). The actual formula is somewhat cumbersome7 , so a table that summarizes all of the 
relevant information will be used instead. 
Payoff Table The payoff table will summarize both the redemption value of the 
level of the project chosen and the level of individual expenditures that you will incur 
depending upon the choices of additions that you and other participants make. This 
table is a rather large table contained in your instructions. The following example will 
demonstrate how you read it. The numbers in the example are completely arbitrary and
in general have no relationship to the actual table .that you will be using. The purpose 
is only to help you to understand how to read the real table. 
*S : 13**ID:9**
o x -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0. 13 -323 - 1 1 9 "" 50 34 23 9 - 1 1 5  -323 -581 -957 I 
0.55 -33 - 1 3  - 1 0  1 1  23 9 -25 -78 -99 -li9 -139 
3 .46 -55 24 48 67 33 -3 -18 -76 - 127 -205 -254 
9.57 4 77 95 214 341 348 343 218 10 -281 -670 
*S : 16**ID:9**
7 lndividual expenditure = (your addition + addition of others) + A (your addition - average addition 
of others)2 - B ( variability of others) .  In experiment No.I,  c = (x + S) + .4 * (x - S/4)2 - .5 * o; in 
experiment No.2,  c = (x + S) + 40 * (x - S/4 )2 - 50 * o. 
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o x -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0.00 23 19 22 30 64 83 49 -11 -23 -81 -95 
0.55 -3 -1 0 14 43 55 -15 -48 -66 -97 -166 
3.46 -5 14 35 87 29 -65 -74 -98 -274 -306 -764 
9.67 77 136 248 360 657 246 119 34 5 -81 -409 
The example table consists three relevant numbers. The first number is the sum of 
the additions chosen by the other participants. This number is located in the upper left
corner of a table. Since it is a sum it is denoted by S. To start, find the example table 
for which S, the sum of the additions of others, is equal to 13. The top row of the table 
lists the possible choices that you might make for your -0wn proposed addition, x. The 
amounts that you have as options in this example range from -5 to +5. Of course these 
might differ from the options that might exist on the real table. 
The left column of the table contains measures of the variability of the proposed 
additions of the other participants, o. This variability measure reflects how scattered the 
additions of others are. For exampie if all of the other participants give the exact same 
number then there is no scatter at all and the variability is zero. Suppose that everyone 
gives a· different number but all numbers differ very little, then the scatter is low as is the 
measure of variability. As a shorthand we will use the term variance for this measure 
of variability of the additions of other participants. 
Suppose that S is 13  and that the variance (of the additions of others) is 3.46. If 
you chose a proposed addition equal to -2 then your payoff is 67. That is, your payoff is 
determined by the sum of the additions of others, the variance and your own addition. 
Each entry of the table is your payoff that corresponds to your choice and the choices of 
the other participants. The payoff could have been calculated from the formulas. Since 
S is 1 3  and you choose -2 the project level chosen is 11. The redemption value for 11 
units would then be determined and the individual .expenditures would also be computed 
by formula and substracted. The table does all of these calculations for you. 
Another example might be useful. Suppose S is 16 ,  variance is 9.67 and your proposed 
addition is 5 .  The example table indicates a payoff of -409 that you would get from such 
a pattern of decisions. 
It is crucial that you go check your payoff tables before and after each decision. As 
you can see that your choice, x, decides which column you will end up; the others' choices 
decide which table and which row of that table you will end up. 
There will be 30 trials for each experiment. The first 5 trials of each experiment will 
be practice trials. You will not be paid for these practice trials. Starting from the 6th 
trial, you will be paid for each decision you make. 
Your file includes a record sheet at the last page of each set of experiment, for you to 
record the results of each trial. At the end of each trial, you should record your proposed 
addition, x, in the first row; the sum of proposals of others, S, in the second row; the 
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variances of others, o, in the third row; and your net payoff, P, in the fourth row. 
Feel free to earn as much cash as you can. Are there any questions? 
Computer Instructions At the beginning of �ach trial, you are free to enter any 
proposed addition, x, between -2 and 6, and then press the F-10 key to send it to
the central computer. If you want to send a negative number, enter the number first 
and then the negative sign. If you would like to change your selection, use the Back 
Space key to delete the selection, and then enter your new selection. Now go ahead and 
enter a number. Notice if you enter a number out of the -2 and 6 range, the computer 
will tell you that your choice is out of range and you need to change your selection. 
Now everybody please use the Back Space key to erase your choice, and then type in 
a negative number by typing the number first and then the negative sign. Now please 
press the F- 10 key and then confirm it by typing y. Once you confirm your choice by 
typing y, you cannot change your choice anymore. After everyone sends their choices,
the computer will calculate the sum of proposals of others, S, the variances of other 
members, o, and your corresponding payoff for this trial, P ,  and send these numbers to 
your screen. This process will be repeated on each trial. Now go ahead and record the 
result of t
.
he first trial to the first column of your record sheet. 
1 Key Func tion Summaries 
F- 1 0 :  send your choice to the central computer. 
Back Space: erase your choices. 
y: confirm your choices before sending off to the central computer.
2 Review Questions 
1 .  If each of you propose the following units: x1 = 5, x2 = 4, x3 = 3 ,  x4 = -2, x5 = 1,
( 1 )  The total level of the project, X = 
(2) The sum of others' proposal, S = 
(3) The variances of these proposed additions for each player is : o1 = 7.00, ai = 8.92,
03 = 10.00, 04 = 2.92, 05 = 9.67. From the payoff table, your payoff for this trial, P = 
2. Suppose all others have the same proposed addition, you alone raise your addition
by 1 unit. then 
( 1 )  The total level of the project, X = 
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(2) The sum of others' proposal, S = 
(3) The variances of these proposed additions for each player is : o1 = 7.00, o2 = 8.92,
o3 = 10.00, o4 = 2.92, o5 = 9.67. From the payoff table, your payoff for this trial, P = 
3. True or false:
(1) Your share of the total cost depends only on your decisions. 
( 2) Each person does not neccessarily have the same total value formula. 
3 Financial Agreement 
Should my earnings from the experiment be negative, I agree to work in the Economic 
Science Laboratory at a rate of 7 dollars per hour until the loss is repaid. 
N az_n� and Signature 
Date 
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Appendix B. The Pilot Experiments 
The pilot experiments used the Smith 5-person experiment design in order to compare 
the Smith Process with the Periodic Process as a "calibration" exercise. Two experiments 
were conducted using Caltech undergraduates. The first experiment is a reproduction of 
the Smith 5-person experiment, with the same instructions, designs and environment as 
in Smith 1978. In the second experiment, we use the same parameters and environments, 
and almost identical instructions except the part that explains the procedure. The equi­
librium choice for the five subjects are x! = x� = 0, x� = 1 ,  x4 = 2,  and x5 = 3 (see
Smith 1978 for the environment) .  In the pilot Periodic process, we let the subjects have 
10 practice rounds before they are paid for each decision they made. (Note in our actual 
experiments with the new design, the subjects have only five practice rounds.)  In both 
cases, the subjects knew their utility functions before the start of the practice rounds. 
[Figure 1 ,  2, 3 about here] 
Figure 1 ,  2 and 3 summarize the results from both pilot experiments. Each experiment 
consists of two sessions. Each session has 30 periods. In the Periodic Process, the first 10 
rounds in session 1 are practice rounds, while there are no practice rounds in session 2. In 
sessions 1 and session 2, it takes 26 and 25 periods respectively for the Smith Process to 
reach the equilibrium state, while it only takes 2 ( 12, if counting the practice rounds) and 
1 1  periods for the Periodic Process to reach the equilibrium under the same environment. 
The practice rounds together with the real trials are graphed to give a sense of the real 
dynamics here. So, in the first 10 rounds of session 1 of the Periodic Process, since 
the subjects are not paid for the decisions they make, there are much more fluctuations 
than the last 20 and 30 rounds. While it is inappropriate to compare the efficiencies 
of the two processes, it is apparent that convergence to the equilibria is much faster 
and individual players follow their Nash equilibrium strategies more frequently under the 
Periodic Process. Interviews with subjects after the experiments reveal reports that in 
the Smith Process they purposely chose their nonbest responses to "make the others bid 
more" . In the Periodic Process, such manipulative behaviors were not found. 
The purpose of these experiments was not a study of comparative performances as our 
interests reside primarily in the role of 'Y· These experiments were performed to establish
our ability to replicate Smith's results. So, while it is not enough to draw a conclusion 
about the two processes based on four experiments, both this and the available data 
suggest that the Periodic Process leads to less cheap talk and manipulative behaviors. 
Experimental Instructions for the Pilot Experiments 8 
8 We only present the one for the Periodic Process here. All tables referred to in this instruction are 
the same as those in the original instruction of the Smith experiments. For the original instruction of 
the Smith Process, see Smith 1978. 
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This is an experiment in the economics of group decision making. The instructions 
are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you me1,y earn 
a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
You are a menber of a group (such as a club, association, or neighborhood) that 
jointly must decide upon, and bear the cost of, a common facility (examples might be a 
playground, road, swimming pool, fence, etc.) . The group must decide on the size of the 
commonlyshared facility as measured by the number of units, N (which might represent 
area in square feeet, or height in feet, etc) .  The total value of the facility to you can be 
thought of as the amount you could obtain if you were to sell your paid-up membership 
in the group. This total membership value, corresponding to different facility sizes is 
listed in the second column of Table 1. Net value, which will be paid to you upon each 
decision you make, is computed by substracting from total value your paid-up share of 
total facility cost. 
Your share of total facility cost is determined by the formula tabulated in Table 2. 
The formula applies to the decisions that result on a series of trials using the following 
process:6n each trial a proposed facility size is determined by taking the algebraic sum of 
the numbers submitted by all members. That is, each member, i, independently selects
a number, ni , representing your proposal as to the number of units to be algebraically 
added to the sum of the other proposals to determin facility size. Suppose that the 
sum, S1 , of the proposals of all other members. is 4 ,  and the proposal of member i is
n1 = - 1 .  Then facility size is N = 3 .  Member i's share of total facility cost in dollars is
then determined by locating the column for Si = 4, and the row for ni = -1, in Table 2; 
suppose it is 57 francs. If, for member i, the total value of a facility of size 3, is 157 francs, 
then, his net membership value would be 100 francs for that trial. In order to sumplify
your clerical task, a complete listing of met membership values has been computed for 
you in Table 3 .  
The first 10 rounds will be practice trials. You will not be  paid for these practice 
rounds. Starting from the 11th round. you will be paid for each decision you make in the 
end . The conversion rate is 1 franc = $
Your file includes a record sheet at the last page, for you to record the results of each 
trial . You are free to select any proposed addition, ni , between -3 and +11, appearing on 
the left of the rows in Table 3 .  Suppose, for example, that five members independently 
choose n1 = 3 , n2 = 3, n3 = 3 ,  n4 = 2, n5 = -3. Each member writes his choice in the 
second row of his record sheet for that trial. In that example, member 1 writes n1 = 3.
I will go to each member and record his choice on my data sheet, then compute facility 
size N = 3 + 3 + 3 + 2 - 2 = 8 and write it on the blackboard. Each member will record
N = 8 in the first row of his record sheet for that trial. You then compute Si , the sum
of all other proposals. by substracting row 2 from row 1 and writing it in row 3 .  In the 
example . member 1 records S1 = N - n1 = 8 - 3 = 5. Each member then locates his 
net membership value in Table 3 by finding the row for ni and the column for Si , and 
recording this number in the fourth row of the rcord sheet. In the example, member 1 
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finds the row for n1 = 3, 81 = 5. This process will be repeated on each trial until it is
stopped. 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 are not the same for all members. They represent your own private 
information. You are not to reveal them to any other member. Feel free to earn as much 
cash as you can. Are there any questions? 
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Balanced Budget Incentive Parameter No. of Subjects Process 
Smith No 'Y = 1 5 Smith 
Smith No 'Y = 1 8 Smith 
Harstad-Mirresse( 1 ) No 'Y = 1 3 Seriatim 
Harstad-Mirresse( 2) Yes 'Y = 0.67 3 Seriatim 
Yes 'Y = 3 4 Seriatim 
Chen-Plott( 1 )  Yes 'Y = 1 5 Periodic 
Chen-Plott(2) Yes 'Y =  100 5 Periodic 
Table 1 .  Comparison of Three Sets of Experiments 
Parameter Ai Bi Qi x� i x� i 
Subject ID ('Y = 1 )  ('Y = 100) 
1 -1  0 55 -1 1 
2 5 0.5 35 0 1 
3 10  0.9 20 1 1 
4 20 1 .8 0 2 1 
5 1 5  1 .2 5 3 1 
I: 49 4.4 1 15 5 5 
Table 2 . 1 .  Parameter and Lindahl Equilibrium Values 
Experiments Period 1 - 30 Period 31 - 60 
(Session a) (Session b) 
0219-93 1 = 1 I = 100 
0304-93 I = 1 00 1 = 1 
0305-93 I = 1 00 1 = 1 
0401-93 1 = 1 'Y = 100
Table 2.2. Features of Experiments 
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Incentives I Session N lo 11 h fa f4 15 16 b ls 
0219-93a 25 .04 . 12 . 16 .20 .04 . 1 2· . 12  .08 .04 
0304-93b 25 . 04 .04 .04 . 16 .08 .36* . 12  .04 .08 
' "( = 1 0305-93b 26 .00 .00 .04 .12 .27 .38* . 1 1  .04 .00 
0401-93a 25 .00 .00 .00 . 12 .32 .24* .24 .04 .04 
Average .02 .04 .06 . 15 . 18 .28* . 14  .05 .04 
0219-93b 25 .00 .00 .00 .04 .20 .52* .24 .00 .00 
0304-93a 25 .00 .00 .04 . 12 .24 .44* . 04 . 12 .00 
"( =  100 0305-93a 25 .00 .00 .04 . 12 .20 .28* . 24 . 1 2  .00
0401-93b 25 .00 .00 .00 .00 . 16 .64* . 16 .04 .00 
Average .00 .00 .02 .07 .20 .47* . 17  .07 .00 
Table 3. Aggregate Frequency of Choices and Efficiency (to be continued) 
Incentives I Jg !10 Ju !12 f13 Average Level Efficiency
.04 .00 .04 .00 .00 4.20 .845 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .04 4.88 .883 
:y = 1 .00 .00 .00 .04 .00 4.85 .942 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 4.88 .975 
. 01  .00 .01 .01 .01 4 .70 .911  
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 4.96 .987 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 4.68 .967 
'Y = 100 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 4.92 .963 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 5.08 .989 
.00 .00 .00 .00 .00 4.91 .977 
Table 3. Aggregate Frequency of Choices and Efficiency (continued) 
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Incentives I Session N l-2 f-1 Jo f 1 h fa f 4 is f 6 
0219-93a 25 .04 .56. .04 . 16 .20 . 00 .00 .00 .00 
0304-93b 25 .96 .oo· .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04 
'Y = 1 0305-93b 26 .58 .23• . 1 1  .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 .04
0401-93a 25 . 12 .76. . 12 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Average .42 .39. .07 .05 .05 .00 .00 .00 .02 
0219-93b 25 .00 .00 .04 .92· .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0304-93a 25 .00 .04 .20 .56. .20 .00 .00 .00 .00 
1 =  100 0305-93a 25 .00 . 04 .24 .56 • . 16 .00 .00 .00 .00
0401-93b 25 .00 .00 . 12 .so· .08 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Average .00 .02 . 15 .7P . 14 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Table 4 . 1 .  Subject l 's Frequency of Choices 
Incentives I Session N f-2 f-1 Jo f 1 h fa 14 is f 6 
021 9-93a 25 .08 .32 .48. . 12  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0304-93b 25 . 28 .24 .36• . 12  .00 . 00 .00 .00 .00 
1 = 1 0305-93b 26 . 00 .08 .31· .61 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0401-93a 25 . 00 . 04 . 84• . 12  .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Average . 09 . 17  .so· .24 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0219-93b 25 .00 .00 . 1 2  .8W .08 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0304-93a 25 .00 .04 .28 .56. .08 .04 .00 .00 .00 
1 =  100 0305-93a 25 .00 .00 . 20 .68 • . 12 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0401-93b 25 .00 .00 .04 .96· .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Average .00 .01 . 16 .75• .07 .01 .00 .00 .00 
Table 4 .2. Subject 2 's Frequency of Choices 
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Incentives I Session N f-2 f-1 Jo Ji h f 3 f4 f s f 6 
0219-93a 25 .00 .04 .40 . 24* .20 . 12  .DO .00 .DO 
0304-93b 25 .00 .00 . 12  . 72* . 16 .DO .OD .DO .OD 
"( =  1 0305-93b 26 .00 .00 . 12  .27* .38 .23 .00 .DO .OD 
0401-93a 25 .00 .00 .60 .40* .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Average .00 .01 .31 .41* . 18 .09 .00 .00 .00 
0219-93b 25 .00 .00 .04 . 96* .DO .00 .00 .OD .00
0304-93a 25 .DO .00 .08 .88* .04 .OD .00 .DO .00
"( =  100 0305-93a 25 .00 .DO .04 .80* .16 .00 .OD .OD .00
0401-93b 25 .00 .00 .00 1 .00* .00 .00 .00 .00 .OD 
Average .00 .00 .04 .91* . 05 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Table 4.3. Subject 3's Frequency of Choices 
Incentives I Session N f-2 f-1 Jo Ji h h 14 f s f 6 
0219-93a 25 .00 .00 .04 .24 .48* .24 .00 .00 .00 
0304-93b 25 .00 .00 . 12  .80 .08* .00 .00 .00 .00 
1 = 1 0305-93b 26 .00 .04 .08 .88 .oo· .00 .00 .00 .00 
0401-93a 25 .00 .00 .00 .04 .68* .28 .OD .00 .00
Average .00 .01 .06 .49 .31* . 13  .00 .00 .00 
0219-93b 25 .00 .00 .00 1 .00* .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0304-93a 25 .00 .00 .00 .96* .04 .DO .00 .00 .00
/ = 100 0305-93a 25 .00 .00 .24 .68* .04 .00 .04 .00 .00 
0401-93b 25 .00 .00 .00 .96* .04 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Average .00 .00 .06 .90* .03 .00 .01 .00 .00 
Table 4.4 .  Subject 4 's Frequency of Choices 
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Incentives I Session N f-2 f-1 lo /1 12 !a f 4 Is f 6 
0219-93a 25 .00 .04 .28 .20 . 16 . 12· . 12  .04 .04 
0304-93b 25 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .oo· . 16 .44 .40 
'Y = 1 0305-93b 26 .00 . 00 .00 . 04 .08 .88* .00 .00 .00 
0401-93a 25 .00 .00 .00 . 12 .64 .20· .04 .00 .00 
Average .00 .01 .07 .09 .22 .30* .08 . 12  . 1 1  
0219-93b 25 .00 .00 .20 .56* .24 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0304-93a 25 .00 .00 .20 .64* .16 .00 .00 .00 .00 
'Y =  100 0305-93a 25 .00 .00 .00 .88* . 12 .00 .00 .00 .00 
0401-93b 25 .00 .00 .04 .88* . 08 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Average .00 .00 . 1 1  .74* . 15  .00 .00 .00 .00 
Table 4.5. Subject 5's Frequency of Choices 
Incentive 'Y = 1 'Y =  100 
Subject ID 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
ai .25 - .44 - .62 -. 77 -.69 .25 .23 .22 .20 .21 
bi -2.5 2.22 3.46 4.32 4.38 - .03 .05 . 1 1  .23 . 1 7  
Table 5 .  Cournot Response Coefficients 
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Incentives I Session 1 2 3 4 5 Statistics 
0219-93a .29 .38 .21 .25 .08 Mean = 0.40100
0304-93b .08 .32 .44 . 36 .48 Stdv = 0.20512
'Y = 1 0305-93b .25 .54 .46 .42 .42 Skewness = 0.81255
0401-93a .75 .96 .50 .33 .50 Kurtosis = 3.86778
0219-93b .88 .83 1 .00 1 .00 .58 Mean = 0.80000 
0304-93a .54 .58 .92 .92 .58 Stdv = 0.16887
"'( =  100 0305-93a .50 .71 .79 . 71 .83 Skewness = -0.41573 
0401-93b .79 .96 1 .00 .96 .92 Kurtosis = 1 .63586
Table 6. Frequency and Statistics of Cournot Behaviors 
Incentives j Session 1 2 3 4 5 Statistics 
0219-93a .25 .50 . 17  .45 . 17  Mean = 0.52000
0304-93b .04 .29 .67 .67 . 50 Stdv = 0.26288
'Y = 1 0305-93b .24 .44 .48 .76 .92 Skewness =-0.14939 
0401-93a .75 .88 .88 .67 .67 Kurtosis = 1. 72501
0219-93b .92 .83 1 .00 1 .00 . 58 Mean = 0.81 100
0304-93a .54 .58 .88 .96 .63 Stdv = 0.16141
''l = 100 0305-93a .58 .71 . 79 . .  71 .88 Skewness = -0.37408
0401-93b . 79 .96 1 .00 .96 .92 Kurtosis = 1 .53620
Table 7. Frequency and Statistics of Carlson-Auster Behaviors 
Independent Variables C1 C2 CA1 CA2 
ones -0 .424 -0.564 6 .452e-002 -0.504 
(-4.524)  (-4.004) (0.703) (-3.556) 
I 1 .809e-002 1 .81 4e-002 1 .388e-002 l .433e-002 
( 1 2 . 187) ( 12 . 193) (9.304) (9.4 1 1 )  
Bi 0 . 159 0.649 
(1 .347) (5.315) 
log likelihood -566.6 -565.69 -568.9 -554.2 
% predicted 69.948 69.948 66.425 69.534 
Table 8. Logit Models for Cournot and Carlson-Auster Hypothesis 
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